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SOME POINTS OF PRACTICE
Acts of 1927
Act of April 27, 1927, P. L. 398.
The common law rule with regard to suits against
corporations limits the venue for such suits to the County
wherein the corporation is domiciled i. e., the place where
the corporation has its principal office or place of business.
This rule was broadened in Pennsylvania by several early
statutes. So that we may now say that actions may be
brought against domestic corporations in any County where
(1) the defendant corporation has its principal office or
place of business-common law rule; where (2) the defendant corporation habitually conducts a substantial and
material part of its business, exercising its franchises and
locating there the whole or a part of its property-Act of
March 21, 1842, P. L. 145, Sec. 8; Act of March 17, 1856,
P. L. 388; where (3) the cause of action arose and the
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action is for damages occasioned by trespass or injury done
by a corporation-Act of June 13, 1836, P. L. 568, Sec. 42.
Actions may be brought against foreign corporations
doing business in this State in any County where (1) the
corporation shall have an agency or transact any business
-Act of April 8, 1851, P. L. 353, Sec. 6; Cochran v. Library
Assn., 6 Phila. 492; Frick and Lindsay Co. v. Md. Pa. Co.,
44 Super. Ct. 518; or where (2) the cause of action arose
and the action is for damages occasioned by a trespass or
injury done by the defendant corporation-Act of June 13,
1836; P. L. 568, Sec. 42; Act of June 8, 1911, P. L. 710;
Eline v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 253 Pa. 204.
The process issued in any such suit may be served in
the manner provided by the Act of July 9, 1901, P. L. 614,
and the amending Act of April 3, 1903, P. L. 139. The title
of the Act of 1901 is:
"An Act relating to the service of certain process in
actions at law and the effect thereof and providing who shall
be made parties to certain writs."

Subsection Fifth of the Act of 1901 provides:
"The writ of summons against a foreign corporation
may also be served in the manner provided by section two,
in any other county than that in which the writ issues, by
the sheriff of such other county, who shall be deputized for
that purpose by the sheriff of the county in which the writ
issues, if the cause of action arose latter in the County * * *"

The Courts have consistently held that process cannot
be legally served in any county unless it has been legally
issued out of a court having competent jurisdiction and
that the Act of 1901 above quoted relates solely to the
service of such process and does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts to issue summons and other writs
against corporations. Park Bros. & Co., v. Oil City B. &
W. Works, 204 Pa. 453; Frick & Lindsay Co., v. Md. Pa.
Co., Supra.
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The Act of April 27, 1927, P. L. 398, is entitled:
"An Act to amend subsections fourth and fifth of section
one of the Act, approved the ninth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and one (Pamphlet Laws, six hundred
fourteen), entitled "An Act relating to the service of certain
process in actions at law, and the effect thereof, and providing who shall be made parties to certain writs", by permitting issuance of writs against foreign insurance companies, or other foreign corporations, out of any county of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvaria by a citizen or corporation of Pennsylvania without regard to the places in which
the insurance was effected, residence of the insured person
at the time of his death, the location of the insured property
or the county in which the cause of action arose."

The title clearly gives notice of an increase in the
jurisdiction of the Courts over suits against foreign insurance companies and other foreign corporations.

So far

as the title of the Act is concerned it would cover any provision authorizing the issuance of process i. e., commencing
action against foreign corporations, and therefore this
amending Act is not limited to service of process as was
the Act of 1901.
Subsection Fifth as amended provides:
Fifth. The writ of summons against a foreign corporation may also be served in the manner provided by Section
Two, in any other County than that in which the writ
issues, by the sheriff of such other county, who shall be
deputized for that purpose by the sheriff of the county in
which the writ issues, if the plaintiff or plaintiffs be individuals, copartnerships or unincorporated associations, any
of whom are citizens of the State of Pennsylvania, or plaintiff or plaintiffs be corporations organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Pennsylvania."
The Act itself is disappointing after the great promise
contained in the itle.

The title used the phrase "by per-

mitting issuance of writs out of any county of the Commonwealth". This clearly affects jurisdiction.
The Act
itself says "The writ of summons may be served".

The
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scope of the amendment does not seem to go beyond the
scope of the original act i. e., service. In fact the same
words are used. In the amendment the words "if the cause
of action arose in the latter County" are changed to "if the
plaintiff or plaintiffs be individuals etc." The words eliminated by the amendment did not confer jurisdiction. Do
the words added by the amendment?
The change in the title is very significant, however.
But it is questionable whether the title can be read into
the Act so as to change its entire nature. In Cochran v.
Library Co., 6 Phila. 492, and cases cited therein, the title
was the basis for limiting an act which was too general.
In Moore v. Chartiers Val. Water Co., 216 Pa. 457, the
title was the basis for broadening the effect of the Act,
but the Act itself at least attemped to accomplish the
purpose set out in the title.
Furthermore it will be noticed that the amended portion of the Act of 1901 provides only for extra county
service of writs and would not apply to actions brought
in the county where service is made.
The discussion relating to subsection Fifth will probably be relevant in considering subsection Fourth relating
to actions on insurance contracts. It should be noted,
however, that there is nothing in the amended subsection
to limit its application-whatever that may be-to foreign
insurance companies as stated in the title.
Act of May 4, 1927, P. L. 719.
"The several Courts of Common Pleas of this Common-

wealth be and are hereby authorized to direct by rule or
standing order, that all writs for the commencement of
actions, all writs of scire facias to revive judgment and continue the lien thereof and all other writs of scire facias,
writs and process of every kind, may, at the election of the
party sueing out the same, be made returnable on the first
Monday of next term or on the first, second, third, or fourth
Monday of any month."
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Under the Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 568, Sec. 30,
every writ issued for the commencement of an action, shall
be made returnable on the first day of the term next
succeeding the time at which it shall be issued. The first
day of each term of the Court of Common Pleas is therefore a return day. There are ordinarily four terms of
Common Pleas Court and, therefore, usually four term
return days to which process may be made returnable.
However, Sec. 31 of the Act of 1836 provides that ten days
shall intervene between the issuing of a summons and the
next term return day. Otherwise the writ cannot be returned to that day, but may be made returnable on the
next day, preceding the last day, of such term, or upon the
first day of the second term next after the issuing of the
writ. In counting the ten days between the issuing of the
writ and the next term return day both the date on which
the summons is issued and the date for its return must be
excluded. In other words ten full clear days must intervene. Steen v. Carlson, 19 D. R. 966. The terms of Common Pleas Court ordinarily continue for one week, so that
the writ returnable on the day preceding the last day of
the term is returnable on Friday of that week. The requirement that ten days must intervene between the issuance and return of the writ does not apply to Philadelphia
and Allegheny Counties. Nor does it hae any application
to the service of the writ.
The Act of May 24, 1878, P. L. 35, amended by the Act
of June 11, 1879, P. L. 125, provides for optional monthly
return days to be fixed by Rule of Court. The Court has
power therefore to provide that process at the election of
the party suing out the same may be made returnable on
the first Monday of the next term i. e. the regular term
return day fixed by the Act of 1836, or on the second, third
or fourth Monday of any intermediate month. It has been
held that where the Court has made such a rule in pursuance of said Act, the Act becomes operative in the County
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for which the rule is made and supersedes the earlier Act
of 1836, so that process must be made returnable to the
term return day or to one of the optional monthly return
days and the day preceding the last day of the term is no
longer available as a return day. Johnson v. Edge, 16
D. R. 400. The Courts have likewise held that if ten days
intervene between the issuance of a writ and the first day
of the next term, the writ cannot be made returnable to a
subsequent return day. In other words an available term
return day cannot be skipped and the writ made returnable
to a subsequent monthly or term return day. Hotchkiss
v. Liverpool, London and Globe Ins. Co., 35 Pa. C. C. 193;
Ingrava v. Suman, 77 Super. Ct. 344. However, an optional
return day established in pursuance of the Act of 1879 may
be skipped and a subsequent return day selected. Slingluff
v. Sisler, 193 Pa. 264. In Price v. Scott, 21 Pa. C. C. 608,
a summons issued September 29, returnable on the second
Monday of November, an optional return day established
by rule of Court in pursuance of the Act of 1879. The
next term return day was October 3. Less than ten days
intervened between the date of issuing and the next term
return day. The Court held that November was not an
intermediate month between the date of the issuance of
the summons and the first day of the next term and therefore the second Monday of November could not be used
as a return day for the writ. The only proper return day
for the writ was the first day of the second term after the
issuance thereof.
The Act of 1927 above quoted adds to the available
optional return days the first Monday of the month. Under
the Acts of 1878 and 1879, the second, third and fourth
Mondays only are available.
Furthermore the Act strikes out the word intermediate
and now the first, second, third and fourth Monday of any
month may be made an optional return day by appropriate
rule of Court. It is no longer required that it shall be a
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month intermediate between the issuance of the writ and
the first day of the next term.
Just what the effect of this Act will be is difficult
to forecast. It is probable, however, that it will cure the
situation disclosed by the case of Price v. Scott, supra, so
that when the next term return day is not available any
subsequent return day not later than the second term return day may be used. It is not probable, however, that
any of the other rules will be materially changed for they
are so well established that rather direct and clear language
should be necessary to alter them.
It is very important, however, that the correct return
day be selected. A writ made returnable at a time not
authorized by law is "essentially illegal" and will be quashed. Ingrava v. Suman, supra.
Act of May 13, 1927, P. L. 992.
Whenever any person or persons, who are authorized
by law so to do, shall bring an action to recover damages for
a death caused by unlawful violence or negligence of the
defendant, the plaintiff may recover, in addition to the
damages now recoverable in such actions, the expenses incurred for medical -and surgical care and for nursing of the
deceased, and such other expenses caused by the injury
which resulted in death as could have been recovered in an
action begun by the injured person in his lifetime; and
plaintiff my also recover the reasonable funeral expenses
of the deceased, if plaintiff has paid or incurred such expenses.

When injury is suffered by reason of an unlawful or
negligent act these situations may arise. (1) The injured
person may bring an action against the wrongdoer to
recover the damages suffered. (2) The injured person
having brought such an action may die pending the termination of the suit. (3) The injured person may die as a
result of the unlawful act or negligence before a suit is
brought for the damages caused thereby.
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The Fiduciaries Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, Sec. 35
(a), provides that no action brought by the injured person in
his lifetime shall abate by reason of the death of the
plaintiff, but the personal representatives of the deceased
plaintiff may be substituted as plaintiff and the suit prosecuted to final judgment and satisfaction. Thus the action
originally instituted by the injured person is continued.
The basis of recovery is not changed by the substitution
of the personal representatives of the deceased plaintiff and
the measure of damages remains the same as if the plaintiff
had survived. Moe v. Smiley, 125 Pa. 141.
The elements of damage in such cases, therefore, include (1) pain and suffering, both mental and physical, up
to the time of the death of the injured person. (2) The
diminution of earning power, during a period of life
which the injured person wonld have lived, had the injury
not been suffered. (3) All necessary and reasonable expenses for medical attention, medicine and nursing, presently incurred and which may be necessary in the future
because of the injury. Mayer v. Traction Co., 181 Pa. 391;
Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Frantz, 127 Pa. 297; Baker v. Hagey,
177 Pa. 128. Physical or bodily pain and suffering in consequence of a wrong occasioning an injury to the person
is a proper element of damages in itself. Mental pain and
suffering in itself is not an element of damages. It must
accompany physical injury and be a natural consequence of
it. North German Lloyd S. S. Co. v. Wood, 18 Super. Ct.
488. The loss of earnings and diminution of earning
power is dependent materially upon the prospects of future
employment and earning as well as of expectancy of life.
Recovery for medical expenses, nursing etc. is limited to
such charges as are reasonable although the expenses need
not have been paid. Brown v. White, 202 Pa. 297. There
are other expenses that may be recovered. For example,
the expense of hiring additional labor to perform the work
the injured person performed before injury, may be re-
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covered. Gilmore v. P. R. T. Co., 253 Pa. 543; Willis v.
Traction Co., 189 Pa. 430. There can be no recovery for
funeral expenses in these cases. That would not be an
element for which the injured person himself could have
recovered. Nor is it a loss to his estate for death is inevitable.
When death is caused by an unlawful act, negligence or
violence, and no suit is brought by the injured person in
his lifetime, the right of action dies with him. The
Fiduciaries Act of 1917, Sec. 35 (b), which attempted to give
to the personal representatives the right to commence and
prosecute all personal actions which the decedent whom
they represent might have commenced and prosecuted does
not apply to such a case for two reasons. In the first place
the injured person could not have commenced an action
for his own death. Strain v. Kern, 2 D. & C. 539. Although
he might have instituted an action to recover the elements
of damage hereinbefore considered. But in the second
place, the title to the Fiduciaries Act is defective and does
not give notice of provisions intended to provide for the
survival of causes of actions. Strain v. Kern, 277 Pa. 209.
It is necessaary therefore to look for another act applicable
to this situation.
Sec. 19 of the Act of April 15, 1851, P. L. 669, provides that whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful
violence or negligence and no suit for damages be brought
by the injured party, the widow, or if there is no widow,
the personal representatives of the injured person may
maintain an action and recover damages for the death thus
occasioned. This act is modified by the Act of April 26,
1855, P. L. 309, which provides that the persons entitled
to recover the damages shall be the husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased and no other relative. The
action provided by these acts is not a survival of the right
of action of the injured person. It is an entirely new
right of action created by the acts mentioned and the action
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brought thereon is an action for death by unlawful violence or negligence as contemplated by the Act of May 13,
1927, P. L. 992. The essentials of this action are: (1)
Death resulting from unlawful violence or negligence, and
(2) no suit by the injured party during his lifetime. When
these essentials are present the action for the unlawful
death may be maintained by (1) the husband or widow,
(2) the children, or (3) parents of the deceased.
The Act of 1851 provides that the damages recoverable shall be for the death thus occasioned by the unlawful
violence or negligence. The elements of damage, therefore, are not the same as those for which the injured person
or his personal representatives could have sued under the
provisions of the Fiduciaries Act above considered. Recovery is therefore limited to the pecuniary loss suffered
by the parties entitled to the sum to be recovered without
any solatium for distress of mind. That loss is what the
decedent would have probably earned by his intellectual
or bodily labor in his business or profession during the residue of his lifetime and which would have gone for the
benefit of the plaintiffs, taking into consideration his age,
ability and disposition to labor and his habits of living and
expenditure. Pa. R. R. v. Butler, 57 Pa. 335. The measure
of damages is not what the deceased would have earned but
only so much of his earnings as the jury find would have
gone for the benefit of his family. Glasco v. Green, 273
Pa. 353. Under this rule it is the duty of the jury to ascertain the earning power of the deceased at the time of his
death, not what he earned in any one year that the jury
may select, and make the basis of his earnings during
the period of his expectancy. In estimating the total damages the jury must consider the time the deceased is expected to live, and also the fact that during that time his
earning capacity will diminish as the years go on. Having
thus ascertained the total sum, its payment must be anticipated and capitalized and the present worth obtained. Burns
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v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 219 Pa. 225. However in North
Pa. R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 44 Pa. 175, the Court said:
"If we are careful to remember that the value of life lost,
to be estimated by a pecuniary standard, is what is to be
recovered for, we shall fall into no such error as in supposing that none but those who can show some actual
damage are entitled to recover. If such were to be the
rule, we should have the indecent spectacle of an investigation whether the loss of a parent or child was or was
not in fact an advantage rather than a loss * * *. In case of

the death of aged persons or helpless infants, we might
expect in the application of such a rule to have the point
discussed whether the death was an actual loss or gain.
The law means not to open the door to anything so shocking. It treats the value of life lost as a species of property and gives it, where children sue, to them in the same
proportions as the personal estate of an intestate is distributed." Also, "The law very properly regards human life
as having pecuniary value to those injured by its untimely
ending through the negligence of others, and is not too
exacting in measuring the standard of such value. See also
Delaware etc. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 128 Pa. 308.
In none of the cases are the expenses .of medical attendance, nursing and funeral expenses recoverable except
where the suit is for the death of a minor child. In such
cases the Supreme Court has followed the English decisions
which construed Lord Campbell's Act. Penna. R. R. v. Barton, 54 Pa. 495; Penna. R. R. Co. v. James, 81 Pa. 194.
However, it would seem that similarly a husband should
recover for the same expenses incurred by reason of the
unlawful death of his wife. Furthermore in McCullough v.
Phila. R. R. Co., 81 Super. Ct. 318, the Court held that a
widow could not recover the funeral expenses of her husband in the absence of evidence as to the estate left by the
decedent for it cannot be assumed that the estate was not
sufficient to pay those expenses. The Court, however,
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does not say that if such evidence had been produced that
a recovery could be had for such expenses.
The Act of 1927, however, expressly allows the recovery
of expenses incurred for medical and surgical care and for
nursing of the deceased and such other expenses caused
by the injury which resulted in death as could have been
recovered by the injured person in his life time and reasonable funeral expenses if the plaintiff has paid or incurred
the same. The basis of recovery for these damages is
fundamentally the same i. e:, compensation for a loss suffered. The expenses therefore must have been paid or
liability for payment incurred by the plaintiff.
ROBERT L. MYERS, Jr.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. SPARGO
Wtinesse-I--lncompetency-Wife Against Husband-Proof of Prior
Testimony Before Committing Magistrate-Act of May 23, 1887,
P. L. S8--Act of May 11, 1911, P. L. 269
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Spargo was indicted for committing statuory rape. At a hearing
before the Justice of the Peace the victim testified that Spargo had
committed the act charged. Before the trial, Spargo and the girl
were married. The girl was called as a witness for the State, but
excluded on objections by the defense. The Commonwealth then
introduced witnesses to prove her testimony before the Justice of
the Peace. Objection by the defense over-ruled, and exception for
the defense. After conviction the defendant appealed because of the
admission of this testimony.
Davis, for Appellee.
Englebach, for Appellant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Luber,. J. The counsel for the Commonwealth has clearly and
very aptly shown that the defendant's appeal is groundless. The
facts present several questions of evidence. We are first confronted
with the question of the competency of witnesses who, having heard
the girl testify at the preliminary proceeding before a Justice of the
Peace, were called upon at the trial to testify as to the girl's evidence,
the girl in the meantime having become incompetent. Point of
counsel for defense is well taken, when he argues the Act of May
23, 1887, P. L. 158, relating to criminal proceedings as amended by
Act of April 2, 1909, P. L. 179, Act of May 11, 1911, P. L. 369, Pa.
Statute 521837, 7 Purdons' 7771, which provides: "Nor shall husband
and wife be competent, or permitted to testify against each other
* * * * except * * * * and in any criminal proceedings against each
other for bodily injury, or violence attempted, done or threatened
upon the other * * * * shall be competent witness against the other."
But counsel for defendant must remember that this statute clearly
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refers to an act committed during time of marriage and does not
apply to the case at bar.
The counsel for defense also claims that inasmuch as the testimony dealt with that which transpired before the marriage, the
common law privilege extended to husband and wife cannot apply,
as it would violate the law of evidence dealing with privileged communications. It is true that the testimony dealt with that which
transpired before the marriage, nevertheless this does not change
or alter the status of the wife. Under the circumstancs her marriage
immediately negatived her testifying against her husband and no
law of evidence was thereby violated.
Counsel for defense claims that the court erred in admitting the
evidence of the witnesses as secondary evidnce when the court had
the best evidence, namly that of the girl, at hand. This contention
again presents the question as to the competency of the girl. The
counsel for defense cites the Act of May 23, 1867 which provides
that: "Testimony given in the former proceeding is admissable in
a subsequent proceeding if the witness is dead, or is out of the
jurisdiction, either tho temporarily absent, or cannot be found after
diligent search, or is sick, or insane, or in such a state of senility as
to have lost his memory," and claims that inasmuch as the girl was
neither absent, dead, sick, or insane, she was competent. Further
that the court erred in allowing the evidence of the witnesses and in
not allowing her evidence. It has been held time and again, namely,
in Marcinkiewisz v. Kutawich, 67 Pa. Superior 260, Com. v. Loomis,
270 Pa. 254 and 256, citing the act of May 28, 1887, P. L. 158, that
the testimony of a witness at a former trial may be offered subsequently where the same criminal issue is involved, if he has become
incompetent for any legally sufficient reason. What constitutes a
legally sufficient reason? In the case at bar the subsequent marriage
of the girl to the defendant is a legally sufficient reason to make
her incompetent to testify.
Now a further question presents itself. The Act of May 23, 1887,
says that: "If one become incompetent for any legally sufficient
reason, properly proven notes of his examination shall be competent
evidence upon a subsequent trial of the same criminal issue. This
rule of law requirees the testimony to have been taken in or before
a court of record. The law involved in this point has been definitely
settled in Brown v. Commonwealth, 73 Pa. 321, 325; Com. v. Bone,
64 Pa. Superior 44 and 52; Com. v. Keck, 148 Pa. 639; Com. v.
Ryhal, 274 Pa. 403, 410; Com. v. Lenousky, 206 Pa. 277, 278. These
cases decided that "Testimony taken before a committing magistrate
will be admitted tho such a court is not a court of record, so long
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as the right to cross examine has been exercised or waived," the

decision being based on the common law rule that the opportunity
and right to cross examine is the criterion for judging of the admissa-

bility of the testimony even in criminal cases. The act explicity calls
for "Properly proven notes." It has been held that this section of
the act does not change or alter the common law and that oral proof
therefore may be received where better proof is not procurable. In
the absence of "proprly proven notes," the act does not expressly
forbid oral proof and so the common law prevails. This was so held
in Wolf v. Scott, 275 Pa. 343 and in Com. v. Brown, 193 Pa. 507 and
in Walbridge v. Knipper, 96 Pa. 48.
. We feel therefore, that the learned court below did not err in
allowing testimony of the witnesses and therefore affirm the decision
of the learned court.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The first question presented is, whether the wife of Spargo was
a competent witness. We are of the opinion that she was not
competent, the crime charged not coming within the exceptions in
the Act of May 11, 1911, P. L. 269. But even if she had been competent, her evidence being excluded on the objection of the defendant, he may not now claim her competent and thus cheat the court
of having her testimony. Merriman v. McNamus, 102 Pa. 102.
She being now incompetent, may her testimony before the Justice
of the Peace be proved orally? Prior to the passage of the act of
May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, such testimony of a competent witness at
a preliminary hearing who later became incompetent, could be proved
by witnesses who heard her testify. Brown v. Com., 73 Pa. 321. Did
the passage of the act of 1887, not covering this situation, impliedly
repeal this common law doctrine?
Keim v. City of Reading, 32
Super. 613 holds that it did not alter this common law ruling. Since
this act, the case of Com. v. Keck, 148 Pa. 639, among others, has
permitted this oral proof of prior testimony. Even the testimony of
a defendant, who waiving his privilege of not testifying, has testified
at a preliminary hearing, may be orally proved at a later trial when
he elects not to take the stand, Com. v. Dougherty, 139 Pa. 383.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
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FRANKS v. CORSON

Index to County Records-Judgment or Mortgage Against Married
Woman-Prior Lien

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Judgment was secured against the married woman under her
husband's name and initials preceded by the word "Mrs." It was
indexed under the same name. Later the woman executed a mortgage under her own name, Mary E. Sales later took place on both

judgment and mortgage, the former taking place first. This is
ejectment by the purchaser under mortgage against purchaser under
judgment.
Lilienfeld, for Plaintiff.
Lengyel, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Lichtenstein, J. The question to be decided in this case is this:
Does the plaintiff or the defendant hold the title of Mrs. Mary Eto the land in dispute? The answer depends upon the question
whether a judgment secured and indexed against a married woman
under her husband's name and initials preceded by the word "Mrs."
is, or is not, a prior lien to a mortgage subsequently executed by the

married woman in her own name? If the judgment is a prior lienthen our decision must be for the defendant; if the mortgage is a
prior lien-then we must hold for the plaintiff.
The Act of April 22, 1856, P. L. 532, sec. 3 provides as follows:
"The lien of no judgment * * * * shall commence or be continued as
against any purchaser or mortgagee unless the same be indexed in
the county where the real estate is situated, in a book to be called
the judgment index; and it shall be the duty of the prothonotary or
clerk forthwith to index the same according to priority of date, and
the plaintiff shall furnish the proper information to enable him to
perform said duty."
It is the duty of the judgment creditor to see that his judgment
is properly entered and indexed so that it may give constructive
notice to subsequent purchasers and lien creditors. Hamilton's Appeal, 103 Pa. 368.
The index is intended to enable any person to learn that there
is a docketed judgment in favor of a certain party or parties, and
against certain other parties, and where to find it on 'the docket.
The inquirer is not required to look thru the whole docket to learn
if there be a judgment against a particular person. When a judg-
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ment has been properly indexed constructive notice of its existence
is thereby given to all the world. 15 R. C. L. 589.
A judgment not properly indexed will usually be held to be invalid as regards subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers without notice. In order to render the judgment binding upon puchasers and
third persons generally, the first name of the defendant as well as
the surname must be properly indexed. Ridgeway's Appeal, 15 Pa.
177 and Crouse v. Murphy, 140 Pa. 335.
In this case the plaintiff's vendor accepted from the married
woman and her husband a mortgage on the land in dispute which,
when recorded, became a first mortgage lien, as the record in the
prothonotary's office then stood. As prospective mortagee, it is to be
presumed that he, prior to parting with his money, searched for liens
against the land that was to be covered bj' the mortgage. If hedid,
he failed to find either on the judgment index or judgment docket
any judgment against Mrs. Mary E. -.
He would have found a
judgment on both docket and index against Mrs. A. B. -,
presumably a different person.
Granting, as we must, that Mrs. A. B. whose name could
have been found on both index and docket, was the same person that
is rightly designated in the mortgage as Mary E. -,
were the
mortgagees bound to know that? We think not. On the contrary
he could rely on the presumption that by different names different
persons are nominated.
In Hutchinson's Appeal, 92 Pa. 186, it was held that a judgment
entered by mistake against W. G. Black when the defendant's true
name was W. A. Black would not be a lien against W. A. Black as
against subsequent incumbrancers.
In Ridgeway, Budd, and Company's Appeal, 15 Pa. 177, it is
held "If the Christian name of the defendant in a judgment is not
entered on the judgment docket, the judgment tho valid as between
parties, cannot affect subsequent purchasers or judgment creditors.
It is the duty of the judgment creditor to see that his judgment
is rightly entered and indexed. To the same effect are Wood v.
Reynolds, 7 W. & S. 406, Mann's Appeal, 1 Pa. 24; Bean v. Patterson, 3 W. & S. 233.
We thing that it is clear that the judgment of the judgment
creditor against the married woman, as it stood on the judgment
index when the mortgagee recorded his mortgage was not a lien
prior to the lien of the mortgage, but that the mortgage when recorded became a first mortgage lien.
The case of Pennsylvania Savings Fund and Loan Assoc. v.
Win. M. George and Co. Ltd., 201 Pa. 43, decided in 1901, affirming
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24 Pa. C. C. 100 is one on all fours with the case at bar. There
a judgment was entered against Mrs. W. A. Newton and in favor

of George and Co. and was indexed the same, showing a judgment
against Mrs. W. A. Newton not Mrs. Nancy A. Newton, nor
Mrs. N. A. Newton. Then the Loan Association entered of record
a mortgage duly executed and acknowledged by Nancy A. Newton,
and her husband, William Newton. Then at a foreclosure sale on
said mortgage the sheriff in due course sold the land to the plaintiff,
deed being acknowledged in open court August 31, 1899. George and
Co. caused a writ of fi. fa. to be issued oh the judgment and the
property in dispute was sold and conveyed by the sheriff to George
and Co.; the sheriff's deed being acknowledged in open court May
10, 1899. Obviously, the sale under the judgment took place three
months and more before the sale on the mortgage.
On these facts, Judge McIlvaine held: "Where a judgment is
entered against the married woman under her husband's name and
initials preceded by the word "Mrs." and is indexed in the judgment
index under the same name, and subsequently the married woman
executed a mortgage in her own name, the lien of the judgment will
be postponed to that of the mrtgage, and a purchaser at a sale under
a mortgage will take title in preference to a purchaser at a sale
ander a judgment. This holding was affirmed in a brief per curiam
opinion when the case was heard on appeal before the Supreme
Court.
In accordance with the views herein expressed, judgment is directed to be entered for the plaintiff for the land in dispute.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The learned court below has held that in order to affect subseqluent purchasers or judgment creditors, a judgment against a married
woman must be recorded and indexed by her christian name rather
than that of her husband preceded by the word "Mrs." While such
holding may seem to work a hardship in the present case, it presents a concise and exact guide for recording and for searchers of
the recording books. It is upheld by the unquestioned case of Pa.
Assoc. v. George, 201 Pa. 43."
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
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Constitutional Law-Foreign Corporation-Unjust Discrimination
by State Statute--Violation of Fourteenth Amendment of
Federal Constitution
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A Pennsylvania statute required personal actions, against domestic corporations, to be brought in the county, in which it had its
chief place of business. It permitted such actions against foreign
corporations in any county. After passage of this statute, a New
Jersey corporation was admitted to do business in Pennsylvania. It
had its place of business in Philadelphia and did no business elsewhere in the State. The plaintiff sued the corporation in Cumberland County in a personal action. Defendant alleged lack of equal
protection of the laws and after judgment against it, appealed.
Schwartz, for plaintiff.
Blaustein, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Engelbach, J. In Lafayette Ins Co. v. French, 18 How. 407, Judge
Curtis held that the legislature of a state has the right to impose
such conditions as they think fit, and these conditions must be deemed
valid and effectual by other states and by this court, provided that
they are not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. In
this case, the statute required that an agent should reside in Ohio
and enter into contracts there in behalf of the foreign corporation
and should be deemed its agent to receive service of process in
suits founded on such contracts. That court held that that condition
was good and valid and did not violate the 14th amendment of the
Constitution.
In Dircut v. Chicago, 10 Wall 410, the court held that the passing
of a statute to discriminate between her own domestic corporations
and those of other states, desiring doing business within her jurisdiction, is clearly established, and the court cites Augusta v. Earle,
13 Peters 519 and Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall 168.
In Daggs v. Orient Ins. Co., 35 L. R. A. 227, the court said, that
the admitting of foreign corporations to do business in this state
rested absolutely in the discretion of the legislature of the state.
The terms it imposes may be reasonable or unreasonable. The comity
ordinarily extended is accompanied by no legal sanction. The state
having extended it, may at any time withdraw it. Doyle v. Wis.,
94 U. S. 50. Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 35; Dueal v.
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Chicago ,10 Vall 415. The state has the power to prescribe conditions under which foreign corporations shall do business in that
state. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall 168, also Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
supra.
In Shannon v. Georgia B and L Ass. (78 Miss. 955), 57 L. R. A.
800, the learned judge said, "that a foreign corporation, which localizes
its business in a state, cannot complain of a provision of its laws
making foreign corporations subject to the usury laws but exempting
domestic associations therefrom".
In Shamber v. Del. and Hud. R. R. Co., 288 Pa. 240, the learned
court said, "Where a foreign corporation is doing business in the
state and has complied with the law as to registration, the place where
the action is brought is a matter for our legislature to determine."
In 12 C. J. 1185, equal protection of laws does not require that
the privilege of actions shall be conferred alike on resident and nonresident defendants, 121 Southern Reports 126.
The courts of a state have jurisdiction of an action against a
foreign corporation doing business therein on a contract made by
it in the state. 12 C. J. 1383. My interpretation of this general
statement is, once a foreign corporation has complied with the laws
of a state, it is amenable to suits on the contract in any court of
the state which has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
A corporation which seeks to establish a business domicile in a
state, other than that of its creation, must take that domicile as
individuals are always understood to do, subject to the responsibilities
and burdens enforced by the laws which it finds in force there.
A corporation created by a state or foreign government can exercise none of the functions or privileges conferred by its charter in
any other state or country, except by the comity or consent of the
latter; subject to constitutional limitations a state has the right to
entirely prohibit foreign corporations from doing business within
the state. Western Union Tel. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; German
American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N. Y. 57. Subject to constitutional
limitations, a state has the right to entirely prohibit foreign corporations from doing business within the state. Having the right
to prohibit foreign corporations from doing business in a state at
all, it is within the power of the state to prohibit the transaction of
business by the foreign corporation within our state, except upon
compliance with such terms or conditions and subject to such restrictions as the state may, in its discretion, see fit to impose, unless
such prohibitions or restrictions imposed, are so conditional as to
violate some provision of the federal constitution. List v. Com.,
118 Pa. 322.
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Where the state has absolute power to exclude foreign corporations and a condition is affixed to the right to come into a state and
a foreign corporation avails itself of such right, it may not assail the
constitutionality of the condition because by accepting this privilege
it has voluntarily consented to be bound by the condition and in
such cases the absolute power of the state is a determining factor
and the validity of the condition is immaterial on the corporation's
right to enter or remain in the state. 14 C. J. 1248.
It has been repeatedly held, and there seems to be no conflict
of authority, that corporations of states have no right to exercise
their franchises in another state, except upon the assent of such other
state, and upon such terms as may be imposed by the state where
the business is to be done. The condition imposed may be reasonable
or unreasonable, and they are absolutely within the discretion of the
legislature. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Raymond, 70 Mich. 485, 501. This
same case held that a special mode of service on a foreign corporation is not a denial of the equal protection of laws.
The provisions of the federal constitution, that no state shall
-deny to any person within its jurisdicion the equal protection of laws
does not prevent a state from excluding foreign corporations altogether or from imposing any conditions as it may see fit before
allowing it to come into the state, for a foreign corporation can only
be entitled to the benefit of this constitutional provision, after it
has come within the jurisdiction of the state. Pembina Consolidated
Silver Mining and Milling Co. v. Pa., 125 U. S. 181; Phila. Fire
Ass. v. N. Y., 119 U. S. 110.
The cases which have been cited in my discussion, altho they
are not in point, with the case at bar, they do apply in that they
demonstrate the power of the legislature of a state, to impose conditions upon foreign corporations which do not apply to domestic
corporations. This New Jersey corporation, Martin Brick Company,
after the passage of this statute, the legality of which it assails,
applied for admittance into the state of Pennsylvania in order that
they be permitted to do business, with full knowledge of the provisions of the statute. They were granted the privilege which they
had asked for. In view of the fact that they applied for admission
into the state knowing of the statute and also its terms, they cannot
now be heard to say that it is unconstitutional.
In view of the cases, which I have cited showing that the
legislature of a state may impose such conditions as it deems just or
necessary upon a foreign corporation which wishes to do business in
that state, I have also cited a case which lays down the rule that
where a foreign corporation is doing business in the state it is in
the power of the legislature to say where the action should be
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brought. The Pennsylvania legislature had the power to prescribe
such rules and conditions as it saw fit, and a foreign corporation

satisfying the requirements to do business in this state must have
assented to all the provisions and conditions, which are conditions
precedent, to doing business in this state.
In view of the above discussion, I render decision for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The authorities cited by the learned court below are interesting
but not controlling. The case is governed by that of Power Mfg. Co.
v. Saunders, 47 Sup. Ct. 678 (U. S. 1927), 71 L. Ed. 807. That case
holds that such a discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations, as is here presented, is arbitrary and unreasonable and
denies the equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the 14th
amendment. It also holds that the corporation by accepting permission to do business within the state does not estop itself from
objecting to unconstitutional statutes. It marks another step in the
increasing protection afforded foreign corporations and appears to
be a wise one. The unlimited power of the state to impose terms onl
foreign corporations is restricted to such as are reasonable and based
on a valid distinction between the two classes. That the present act
would seem to be denying them the equal protection of the laws is
patent and it can not be sustained.
The judgment of the learned court below is reversed.

THOMAS v. CLYDE
Torts-Slander-Testimony on Witness Stand of Irrelevant MatterAbsolute Privilege
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In an action for slander, the alleged statements were made by the
defendant, while upon the witness stand, in the trial of a civil action
between both parties. While they were so made, they were not
relevant to the question asked, and were false and malicious. The
court instructed the jury that these statements were privileged and
error is assigned to this ruling.
Garrison, for plaintiff.
McLaughlin, for defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Larimer, J. The question involved in this case is one of grave
importance and one that never has been before this court for consideration. A review of the decisions of other courts shows that the
authorities are divided. The English courts have established and
have followed the rule of absolute immunity ever since the time of
Coke, which has been followed in this country by a few states,
namely. Kentucky, Maryland, California and Texas. By a great
majority, the courts of the United States have qualified the English
rule. Before a final decision can be rendered, it is necessary to
carefully consider the merits and effects of the different holdings.
The rule, as stated by the English courts, is that judges, counsel,
parties and witnessees are absolutely exempted from liability to an
action for defamatory words published in the course of judicial proceedings, regardless of whether they were or were not relevant or
material to the issue. (36 C. J. 1251 and cases cited) For the American States following this rule see, Sebree v. Thompson, 126 Ky.
223, 103 S. W. 374; Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179; Runge v. Franklin, 72 Texas 585, 10 S. W. 721. The fundamental reasons for such
a holding as given by the several courts, in elaborate decisions, are,
first, that the remedy for a dishonest witness is limited to the criminal
prosecution for perjury; second, that it is damnum absque injuria,
that is, loss or damage occasioned without wrong, and for which there
is no legal remedy; third, that it is of the greatest importance to the
administration of justice that witnesses should go upon the stand
with their minds absolutely free from apprehension, that they may
subject themselves to an action of slander for what they may say in
giving their testimony. Most of the courts have based their decisions
on the last of the above reasons, and since it appears the most
logical, we will review its merits.
For the proper administration of justice, it is essential that the
courts have the power to compel witnesses to appear before the
court, and it is equally essential that they have the power to compel
witnesses to testify. But to what do the courts compel the witness
to testify? Only to that which is relevant to the issue. No one
would doubt that it would be contrary to the rules of justice if the
courts would compel a witness to testify and by doing so would
subjec't him to an action of slander. In that respect, the witness must
be fully protected, and is by all courts, but should that protection
extend to irrelevant and immaterial statements. It may be argued
that witnesses do not know what is relevant and material, but that is
within the discretion of the courts to exclude any question by counsel
and to prohibit any answer, by the witnesses, that is irrelevant or
immaterial. By giving the witness absolute immunity in order to
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establish justice for one party, they are opening the doors for the
depravation of justice from many others. We believe this is opening
the door too wide.
All courts grant absolute immunity where the question or answer
is relevant to the issue, but the large majority of the American
courts have qualified the English rule by holding that the absolute
immunity is given only when the answer is relevant. (36 C. J. 1251,
note 30) The reason for this qualification is best stated in Myers v.
Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 by Mr. Justice Parkhill in which he
said, "We hold this to be the true rule. In coming to this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the weighty reasons advanced in favor
of the English doctrine of absolute privilege for defamatory words
published in the course of judicial proceedings; that it is to the
interest of the public that great freedom should be allowed in complaints and allegations with a view to have them inquired into;
and that the parties and counsel should be indulged with great
latitude in the freedom of speech in the conduct of their cases in
courts and in asserting their rights, because in this way the purpose
of justice will be subserved, and the court can and will protect the
party agreived by expunging irrelevant, defamatory matter from the
pleadings, and by punishing for contempt of court the guilty party.
We think the ends of justice will be effectually accomplished by not
extending the privilege so far as to make it an absolute exemption
from liability for defamatory words, wholly and entirely outside of,
and having no connection with, the matter of inquiry. For what
reason should a person be absolutely privileged to defame another in
the course of a judicial proceeding by making slanderous statements
wholly outside the inquiry before the court. We think it unnecessary
to carry the doctrine so far. The ends of justice can be effectually
accomplished by placing a limit upon the party or counsel who avails
himself of his situation to gratify private malice by uttering slanderous expressions and making libelous statements which have no relation to, or connection with, the cause in hand or the subject of
inquiry." We wholly agree with this reasoning.
Although, as said before, there are no Pennsylvania decisions
directly on point, there are a few decisions containing dicta to the
effect that the qualified rule is the better one. Gray v. Pentland,
2 S. & R. 23; Chapman v. Calder, 14 Pa. 365. In Kemper v. Fort,
219 Pa. 85, Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the court, gave a thorough
review of the different rules and though not called upon to decide in
that case said, "We are inclined to the view that for false and malicious
defamatory allegations, appearing in pleadings filed in a court having
jurisdiction of what is set forth in them, there is absolute immunity
from a suit for libel, at the instance of the defamed party, only when
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the defamatory words are relevant and pertinent to the matter or
matters to be inquired into by the court." In Kemper v. Fort, supra,
the court held that where the question of relevancy and pertinency
of matters, alleged in pleadings, is to be inquird into, all doubt be
resolved in favor of relevancy and pertinency. We think the same
rule would apply as to testimony by witness.
Upon due deliberation and consideration we hold in accordance
with the qualified doctrine, as laid down by the large majority of the
American courts, which, in our judgment, the administration of justice
and a sound public policy demands, and reverse the judgment of the
lower court.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed in its
opinion.

STOVER v. WASS
Contracts--Breach of Contract to Marry-Limitation of Action for
Breach-Act of March 27, 1713, 1 Sm. Laws 76
Act of June 24, 1895, P. L. 236
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff brings an action on August 1, 1927, for damages
for breach of contract to marry. The breach occurred on August 1,
1924. The defendant pleads the Statute of Limitations as a defence.
Luber, for plaintiff.
Kligman, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Crabtree, J. The main issue in this case is outstanding, and has
been agreed upon by the counsels for both parties, it being, "is the
Statute of Limitations, as pleaded by the defendant, a bar to this
action for the breach of a contract to marry?"
We will consider first whether or not mutual promises to marry
constitute a contract, and if so, to what extent. A contract may be
defined as an agreement, the fulfillment of which promises is enforceable at law. The law requires that every contract, to be binding,
must be based on what is deemed consideration, and here, it may be
said that the promise of each is a sufficient consideration for the
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the defamatory words are relevant and pertinent to the matter or
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
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promise of the other. In Ellis v. Guggenheim, 20 Pa. 287, the action
being brought in assumpsit for the breach of a contract to marry,
Woodward, J. said, "In an action by a woman for the breach of a
contract to marry, she is bound to prove not only a promise on the
part of the defendant, but a promise on her own part. If there be
not mutual promises, the contract is void for want of consideration."
Following this decision then, it is legally logical to say that where
there are mutual promises, which impart a sufficient consideration to
support a simple contract, the breach of one of these promises would
justify an action at law. Where there has been a promise to marry,
which has been secured by the promise of the other party to marry,
a breach of either promise would be a breach of a contract. (Ellis
v. Guggenheim, supra.) Therefore, having proven that the relation
is that of a contract, an action to recover for its breach must
necessarily be brought in assumpsit. Act of May 25, 1887, P. L. 271;
Harding v. Lee, 12 Dist. Rep. 49; Donovan v. Foley, 5 Dist. Rep. 91;
Deitrich v. Davis, 274 Pa. 213.
In

Pennsylvania, there is no Statute of Limitations of actions

relating specifically to actions for the breach of contracts to marry.
Therefore, we will have to refer to the Statute limiting actions on
contracts generally. Under the Act of March 27, 1713, I Sm. Laws
16, actions on contracts are limited to six years; that is, the action
must be brought within six years after the date of its accrual. In
the case at bar, the action is one in assumpsit, as previously shown,
and would consequently, be included in this act, since there is no
specific act relating to it. We will here cite two cases, Johnson v.
McCain, 145 Pa. 531 and Agnew v. Fetterman, 4 Pa. 56, merely to
show that this Act is a limitation on actions in assumpsit. It has
also been previously shown that the proper action in a suit for the
breach of a contract to marry is assumpsit. Harding v. Lee, supra.
We think that the above Statute would apply to this action.
Counsel for the defendant contends that this is a personal action,
and is thereby barred if not brought within two years after its
accrual. This argument, we think, is untenable.
However, in Pennsylvania, there is a Statute, June 24, 1895, P. L.
236, which limits actions, for personal injuries not resulting in death,
to two years. It has been held many times that a personal action
dies with the person; but the term "personal action" is merely a
vague expression. In a large sense, all actions except those for the
recovery of real property may be called personal. This position is
also too general. Considering the contract in question, in its general
operation, there was no special damage done, and this, in the case
of Lattimore v. Simmons, 13 S. & R. 183, was held to be the only
condition upon which the action could survive the person. Again,
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in this contract, the breach of it did no damage, except to the
feelings of the injured party, and therefore, cannot survive the person
thus making it a personal action.
In Pennsylvania, the statute which was enacted June 24, 1895,
P. L. 236, pertaining to actions for personal injuries, and limiting
their existence to two years, treats them as actions for personal
bodily injuries, which do not result in death, and hence, is not applicable to the argument presented by the defendant. We can further say that this statute does not apply because Section 2 in which
the time limitation was set, and which reads, "every suit hereafter
brought to recover damages for personal injury, wrongfully done to
the person, in cases where the injury does not result in death, must
be brought within two years from the time when the injury was
done, and not afterwards", was held to be unconstitutional and void,
because while the Legislature has full power over the remedy, it
cannot exercise this control in such a manner as to destroy the right
of action. The right to recover for a tortious injury is a vested right.
Byers v. Penna. R. R. Co. 18 County Court Rep. 187.
We are constrained to hold that the breach of a promise to
marry is the breach of a contract duty, and the action for the recovery of damages for its breach is assumpsit, and arises ex contractu and falls within the scope of the Act of March 27, 1713, hereinbefore cited, and the right of action exists for six years from the
time of its accrual thereof. Therefore, in view of the foregoing conclusions, we cannot adopt the theory of analogy as advanced by the
counsel for the defendant.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The only statute of limitations which could possibly apply to the
present action other than that of March 27, 1713, I Sm. L. 76 would
be Sec. 2 of Act of June 24, 1895, P. L. 236. And this is so whether
the action be trespass or assumpsit altho the latter is undeniably the
proper action.
Is the Act of 1895 applicable? The wording of the statute clearly
shows that it is not applicable to all injuries to the person but
only to bodily injuries. While the injury involved in breach of contract to marry is personal it can by no means be said to be a bodily
injury. Boyd v. Snyder, 207 Pa. 330, held that the Act was not applicable to a suit for malicious prosecution where the injury is closely
analogous to the one involved here. Lattimore v. Simmons, 13 S.
& R. 183, merely held that there was not an injury to the property
of the plaintiff which would permit the action to survive against the
executor of a decedent.
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The fact that no case of this sort has arisen is persuasive that it
is conceded that the six year period is applicable. The dicta in
Hushour v. Nye, 4 Dauphin 109, that the six year period applies is
also persuasive.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

CONWAY'S ESTATE
Wills-Revocation-Proof of Contents of Destroyed Will-Act of
June 7, 1917, P. L. 405--Evidence-Competency of Attorney
as to Contents of Will
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Conway had his attorney execute a will for him in December,
1920, signed it and left it with the attorney for safe keeping. In
December, 1925, he called the attorney on the phone and told him to
destroy the will as he was about to make a new one. This, the
attorney did by burning the will. Before Conway made the second
will, he died. Jackson, the chief legatee under the destroyed will,
sought to prove it by the testimony of the attorney, claiming the
revocation was invalid. The register refused to allow it's probate
and Jackson appealed to the Orphans' Court.
Mulhollen, for plaintiff.
M. Cohen, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
McLaughlin, J. The sole question for the determination of this
court is, did Jackson, proponent of the destroyed will, attempt to
prove it so as to satisfy the provisions of the Wills' Act of 1917,
P. L. 405.
Counsel for contestants concede that the revocation was invalid.
The Wills Act of 1917 (P. L. 409 Sec. 20) says that when the act of
revocation is done by one other than the testator, it must be done in
his presence and by his express direction. "Presence", says Greenleaf, "must constitute corporal appearance, also mental capability of
recognizing and actual consciousness of the act performed before a
person", Greenleaf on Evidence, Vol. 2 page 657. Altho the Pennsylvania Courts have never decided whether a revocation by phone
constitutes sufficient presence, we think such presence is insufficient.
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Mulhollen, for plaintiff.
M. Cohen, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
McLaughlin, J. The sole question for the determination of this
court is, did Jackson, proponent of the destroyed will, attempt to
prove it so as to satisfy the provisions of the Wills' Act of 1917,
P. L. 405.
Counsel for contestants concede that the revocation was invalid.
The Wills Act of 1917 (P. L. 409 Sec. 20) says that when the act of
revocation is done by one other than the testator, it must be done in
his presence and by his express direction. "Presence", says Greenleaf, "must constitute corporal appearance, also mental capability of
recognizing and actual consciousness of the act performed before a
person", Greenleaf on Evidence, Vol. 2 page 657. Altho the Pennsylvania Courts have never decided whether a revocation by phone
constitutes sufficient presence, we think such presence is insufficient.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The testimony of the attorney who wrote the will is competent,
28 R. C. L. 551, 17 L. R. A. N. S. 109. It is superfluous to decide
this question, as it is also conceded by counsel for contestants.
The Wills Act of 1917 (P. L. 405 Sec. 2) reads-"Every will shall
be in writing, and, in all cases, shall be proved by the oaths or
affirmations of two or more competent witnesses; * * * otherwise
such will shll be of no effect". It is to be noted that in Pennsylvania, a will need not be attested by witnesses. 28 R. C. L. 123.
It is therefore irrelevant to consider, as proposed by counsel, whether
the will was validly attested when made. The question to be decided
is whether it was proved in accordance with the statute.
Hodgson's Estate, 270 Pa. 210, was the first case arialagous to
the one at bar, to be decided under Sec. 2 of the Wills Act (cited
supra) that pertained to lost or destroyed wills. The court held in

that case, "under the act to establish a lost will there must be proof
by two or more witnesses, not only of due execution, but of the contents substantially as set forth in the copy offered for probate. Proof
of a lost will is made out only by proof of execution and of contents
by two witnesses, each of whom must separately depose to all the
facts necessary to complete the chain of evidence, so that no link in
it may depend on the credibility of but one". See also Hock v.
Hock, 6 S. & R. 47; Rhodes' Estate, 241 Pa. 38; Glockner v. Glockner,
263 Pa. 393. There is no material difference in proving a lost will
or an alleged revoked will, and the same rule applies. The court
further says, "even though the scriviner had witnessed the will and
then made the copy as he did in Rhodes' Estate (supra) there would
be but one witness to the contents". The language of the court is
so express and pertinent to the facts of this case that further reasons
given would border on redundancy.
Lowman's Estate, 272 Pa. 237, reiterates the doctrine of Hodgson's
Estate (supra) saying, "the burden of proving a lost will is on proponent, and in this case the proof of execution of will was met, but
proof of its contents failed to meet the requirements of the act. The
attesting witnesses knew nothing of the contents of the will. There is
a fatal hiatus in the evidence which avoids bringing it within the
Wills Act, requiring a lost will to be proved by two or more witnesses,
otherwise it will have no effect".
The law of Pennsylvania is very plain on this subject as shown
from these authorities.
Decree of register affirmed. Appeal Denied.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed in its
opinion.

